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Plaintiff-Respondent, 
) 
) 
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vs. ) 
DARRELL EUGENE HEATH, 
) 
) 12610 
) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
On the 12th day of April, 1971, the 
appellant was charged with the crime of grand 
larceny in connection with the alleged theft 
of one 1965 Mercury Cornet automobile, belong-
ing to Lillian Hales and Larry Hales. The 
appellant was subsequently bound over to the 
Fourth District Court to stand trial for the 
accused crime. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After trial held on the 27th day of 
May, 1971, the jury found the appellant 
guilty of grand larceny as charged in the 
complaint. This is an appeal from that 
conviction. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks reversal of the lower 
court's judgment and his resulting conviction. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about the 12th day of April, 
1971, Lillian Hales was the registered owner 
of a 1965 Comet two-door hardtop automobile, 
white in color (Tr. 12-13, 22, 30). The 
principal user of the vehicle was her son, 
Larry Hales (Tr. 17), and it was the said 
Larry Hales who had in fact paid for the 
vehicle. (Tr. 22,24). The vehicle was pur-
chased in May, 1969, for approximately $1,100.00 
(Tr. 13,29) and was sold on or about the 15th 
day of April, 1971, for $300. 00. (Tr. 16, 28). 
Larry Hales also received the proceeds of the 
sale (Tr. 20,28). 
On the evening of April 11, 1971, the 
1965 Cornet was parked in front of the Hales 
residence located at 57 North 6th East in 
Spanish Fork, Utah (Tr. 19,28). The record 
is not clear, however, when the car was last 
seen that evening. On the morning of April 
12, 1971, sometime between the hours of 5:00 
o'clock and 5:30 o'clock a.m., Lillian Hales 
and Duane Hales, her husband, were awakened 
by the sound of a motor starting (Tr. 12,21-22). 
Both Mr. and Mrs. Hales looked out the window 
and saw what appeared to be the 1965 Comet 
belonging to Mrs. Hales driving North on 6th 
East street (Tr. 12,22). They did not actually 
see the auto leave from in front of the house 
nor could they make any identification of the 
person driving the vehicle (Tr. 19,24). In fact, 
Mrs. Hales could not even make an absolute 
Positive identification that the car she saw 
~s in fact the 1965 Cornet belonging to her. 
(Tr . 18 -19 ) . 
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At approximately 5:30 o'clock a.m. on 
the morning of April 12, 1971, Larry Hales 
was awakened by his father. (Tr. 26) . Upon 
observing that the 1965 Comet was missing, he 
promptly telephoned the Spanish Fork Police 
Department and the Utah Highway Patrol and 
informed them of the missing automobile 
(Tr. 26-27). Later that same morning at appro-
ximately 5:40 a.m., Blair Bradford, a trooper 
with the Utah Highway Patrol was proceeding 
North on I-15 at approximately the Ironton 
overpass in Utah County, when he saw a white 
1965 Comet two-door hardtop cross the overpass 
and pull onto the freeway in front of him 
(Tr. 32). Mr. Bradford, apparently suspicious 
for some reason, called his dispatcher, gave 
her the license number of the 1965 Comet and 
asked that a registration check be made. (Tr.33). 
Bradford then decided to pull the Comet over 
and radioed ahead to the Provo City Police 
Department for help (Tr. 33). The 1965 Comet 
PUlled off on to the Center Street exit going 
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into Provo. Officer Bradford turned on his 
lights and the Comet proceeded to pull over. 
Just before stopping, however, the car pulled 
away from the curb and a high speed chase 
through the west side of Provo insued. (Tr.33). 
Officer Bradford was able to stop the vehicle 
only by ramming its right rear fender with his 
patrol car. (Tr. 34) . The sole occupant of 
the Comet immediately jumped out of the car 
and began running on foot. When Bradford 
waived his shotgun and yelled at him to stop, 
he promptly did so (Tr. 35). Officer Bradford 
identified that person as the defendant. 
(Tr. 35). The defendant was placed under arr-
est by a Provo City police officer (Tr. 35), 
and was not informed of the charges against 
him or of his legal rights (Tr. 41). 
Although the defendant was desirous 
of being represented by counsel, he did not 
have any communication with any legal counsel 
whatever until the day of his preliminary 
hearing, at which time Don R. Peterson, 
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cour~-~ppointed counsel, spoke with the defen-
dant for approximately five to ten minutes 
before the preliminary hearing. Although 
the defendant had produced three witnesses 
to testify in his behalf and who were all in 
attendance at the hearing, Mr. Peterson 
declined to call the witnesses and refused 
even to consult with or interview the witnesses 
who were present in the courtroom at the time, 
(See affidavit of defendant on file in the 
record herein) . 
The defendant's court-appointed attorney 
entered a plea of "not guilty" and made the 
customary motion to dismiss for lack of 
evidence. The motion was denied and the 
defendant was bound over for trial. 
On about May 15, 1971, the court-
appointed counsel came to visit the defendant 
for 10 minutes in the Utah County Jail at 
Which time the defendant's counsel told him 
that, "Because r am court-appointed, I cannot 
do too much for you, but if you can give me 
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some money, I may be better able to help you. 11 
(See affidavit of defendant on file in the 
record herein) . When the defendant responded 
that he did not have any money, counsel then 
asked him to borrow from relatives. Defendant 
told counsel relatives would not help and 
counsel reiterated that he was deeply involved 
in civil matters and that he did not have 
much time to spend, but that if he had some 
money, he could afford to put an associate 
~ work on the case with him and they could 
do a much better job of defense. (See affidavit 
of defendant on file in the record herein) . 
The defendant told his attorney again 
the names and addresses of witnesses who could 
testify on his behalf and the attorney respond-
ed, "Tell them to come and see me". The 
defendant then informed his attorney of his 
prior history of excessive drug abuse and 
suseptibility to drug "flashback" phenomenon 
and the hospital personnel who could corroborate 
his medical history. He also told his lawyer 
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of past occurrences of infectious hepatitis 
and that he was again afflicted with the disease 
and was seriously ill and he asked his attorney 
to send a doctor to the jail to examine him 
and precribe some medication since the jail 
officials refused to remove him to the hospital 
because he was allegedly an escape risk. 
Approximately a week to ten days later 
the defendant's court appointed attorney called 
the defendant on the telephone at the jail 
for a two minute conversation and asked him if 
he would be willing to plead guilty to a lesser 
offense. The defendant refused and the 
conversation terminated without any further 
discussion of the case, its merits, possible 
defenses or witnesses. (See affidavit of 
defendant on file in the record herein). 
A few days prior to trial, the attorne 
came to the jail again to have the defendant 
sign an affidavit of impecuniosity. At this 
time he again told the defendant without some 
money he could not expect too much. The 
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dPfendant at this time informed his attorney 
that he lvas gravely ill and asked him to bring 
a writ of habeas corpus in order to get him 
into a hospital. His attorney informed him 
iliat such a writ would cost money. He also 
said that such writs were time consuming and 
that his schedule was very busy. (See affidavit 
ot defendant on file in the record herein). 
After a 30-day bout with hepatitis the 
~fendant finally persuaded one of the jailers 
to have a doctor come in the jail. A Dr. Clark 
fiMlly came to the jail and affirmed the 
~fundant's contention that he was suffering 
from hepatitis (from which he had suffered 
severe and irreparable liver damage) . 
On the morning of May 27, 1971, immedia-
tely before the trial, defendant's attorney 
spoke briefly (about 30 minutes) with the 
defendant and his witnesses. This was the 
first and only time defendant's lawyer had ever 
Spoken to any of the defense witnesses and 
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the only time he ever seriously discussed the 
merits of the case and possible defenses with 
the defendant. 
The defense attorney made no medical 
background investigation nor did he attempt 
to introduce at trial any evidence as to 
drug flashback interludes even though urged 
to do so by the defendant, nor did he conduct 
any kind of background investigation to 
secure evidence to support the defendant's 
explanation as to his possession of the 
automobile. 
When the verdict of guilty was returned 
by the jury, the defendant urged his attorney 
to file notice of appeal which he refused 
to do; whereupon, the defense attorney promptly 
requested the court to dismiss him from future 
defense of the case. 
The defendant, Darrell Eugene Heath, 
thereafter filed his own notice of appeal and 
Petitioned the court to appoint new counsel to 
attempt to salvage his claim. 
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In addition to the facts pertinent to 
this case, the Defendant, during the time he 
was incarcerated in the County Jail, requested 
his counsel to arrange for his attendance 
at a divorce hearing in which he was defendant 
and desired to be present and represented by 
counsel; his request was totally disregarded 
and ignored by his counsel. Furthermore, 
the Court-appointed counsel refused to invest-
igate the possibility of bail in view of an 
outstanding parole hold, even though he was 
seriously ill with hepatitis. (See affidavit 
of defendant on file in the record herein). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
GRANT DEFENDANT'S .MOTION TO DISMISS 
AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE PRESENTATION 
OF THE STATE'S CASE. 
A. THE STATE FAILED, AS A MATTER 
OF LAW, TO PROVE THAT DEFENDANT 
TOOK THE 1965 COMET. 
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 
76-38-1, Utah Code Annotated (1953), larceny 
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is defined as "the felonious stealing, taking, 
carrying, leading or driving away of the per-
sonal property of another." Section 76-38-4, 
Utah Code Annotated (1953) then goes on to 
define grand larceny as larceny "when the pro-
perty taken is of value exceeding $50.00". 
As can be seen above, one of the essential 
elements of the commission of the crime of 
larceny is the taking of property belonging 
to another and as a result thereof, before an 
individual can be convicted of larceny, it 
must be proved by the State beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant did in fact take the 
property. 
In the instant case, the State presented 
no direct evidence that the defendant took 
the automobile in question. The State pre-
sented no witnesses who either saw the defen-
dant take the automobile; who saw the defen-
dant in the vicinity where the automobile was 
allegedly taken at or about the time it was 
allegedly taken; or who testified as to any 
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statements made by the defendant that he 
intended to take the automobile or that he 
in fact had taken it. The only evidence 
presented by the State which linked the 
defendant to the alleged larceny was that he 
was in possession of the vehicle in question 
shortly after it was allegedly stolen. The 
rule that mere possession of recently stolen 
property is insufficient evidence upon which 
to base a conviction of larceny has been long 
established in this state. As early as 1889, 
in the decision of People v. Swazey, 6 Utah 
93, 21 P.400, the Utah Supreme Court made 
this pertinent comment concerning the effect 
of recent possession in a trial for larceny: 
If the property had been found in 
the defendant's possession immedia-
tely after loss, such possession 
might have been a circumstance to 
be taken into consideration by a 
jury, with other circumstances, 
in ariving at a conclusion as to the 
guilt or innocense of the def~n~ant. 
But of itself it was not sufficient. 
It seems now to be an established 
doctrine, especially in this western 
country, that in larceny the r~cent 
possession of stolen property is not 
of itself sufficient to warrant a 
conviction. (21 P. at 402). 
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The legislature has provided the State 
with aid, however, in proving its case of 
larceny if it can add an additional circumstance 
to the circumstance of recent possession. 
Section 76-38-1 Utah Code Annotated (1953)in 
discussing proof of larceny contains the 
following pertinent language: 
Possession of property recently 
stolen, when the person in possession 
fails to make a satisfactory explana-
tion, shall be deemed prima facie 
evidence of guilt. 
This section permits the State to get 
to the jury when there is no direct evidence 
of the taking if it can show both recent poss-
ession of stolen property by the defendant 
and that the defendant had no satisfactory 
explanation for his possession. Proof of 
both elements is absolutely necessary. Perhaps 
the leading case construing this statute is 
State v. Potello, 40 Utah 56, 119 P.1023 (1911). 
The Supreme Court reversed a lower court ver-
dict of grand larceny based in part upon the 
Presumption above-discussed. In that case, 
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the State had failed to present any direct 
evidence which linked the defendant to the 
alleged larceny. In discussing what the State 
had to show, therefore, in order to justify 
a verdict of gui 1 ty, the court said at 119 
P.1028: 
There being no direct evidence of the 
taking by the defendant, to indulge 
the presumption or draw the inference 
of the felonious taking of the property 
by him, the state is required to prove 
the facts of the larceny, recent 
possession in the defendant, and that 
he failed to satisfactorily explain 
his possession. These facts must not 
themselves be left to mere inference or 
presumption; they must be proved. 
In explaining more fully what the statute 
meant in requiring the defendant to make a 
satisfactory explanation, the court said at 
119 P.1037: 
We think a fair meaning of the statute 
is that, to make a prima facie case of 
guilt, the state, in the absence of other 
evidence, must show the larceny, recent 
possession in the accused, and that he 
failed to make a satisfactory explanation. 
That is, that he, when asked about his 
possession, or when called upon to explain 
it, remained silent when he ought to have 
spoken, or gave an untruthful account~ or 
unreasonable, or improbable, explanation 
of it; or gave some explanation not 
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consistent with innocense. 
It is also important to note that it is 
the State which must show the lack of a reason-
able explanation and not the defendant which 
must carry the burden of proving a reasonable 
explanation. 
In speaking to that very question, 
the Potello cou~t said at 119 P.1027: 
It would seem a very strained construction 
of the statute to say that, when the State 
had aduced proof tending to show the larceny 
and recent possession in the accused, it 
could rest, and then shift or cast the 
burden on the accused to satisfactorily 
explain his possession. To say that would 
mean that the state in the first instance 
was required to only prove the larceny and 
recent possession in the defendant, which, 
under the terms of the statute, is not a 
prima facie case, and then cast the burden 
on him to explain his possession, which if 
done by him satisfactorily and consistent 
with innocense, then the state had not made 
a prima facie case. If, however, he had 
failed or was unable to make such an ex-
planation to the satisfaction of the jury, 
then the state had made a prima facie case 
of guilt. That is, the question of whether 
the state in the first instance and when it 
rested had made a prima facie case would 
depend upon the showing made by the defendant 
with respect to his possession and whether 
it was accounted for or explained to the 
satisfaction of the jury. And hence they, 
and not the court, would determine and be 
the judges of whether the state had made 
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a prima facie case, a doctrine violative 
of al~ principles of criminal jurisprudence. 
We think the statute does not mean that. 
The court clearly held that the State 
as part of the presentation of its case in 
chief, must prove not only the larceny and 
recent possession of the stolen property by 
the defendant, but in addition, the failure 
of the defendant to satisfactorily explain 
his possession of the property. 
A review of the record will quickly 
reveal that the State did not meet its burden 
as required in the Potello case and by Section 
76-38-1. The State made no effort whatsoever 
in the presentation of its case in chief to 
show that the defendant failed, when asked, to 
satisfactorily explain his possession of the 
automobile or that any such explanation given 
by the defendant was unsatisfactory. The 
record does not disclose whether or not the 
officers who arrested the defendant or anyone 
else thereafter ever asked him why he was in 
possession of the automobile or how he came 
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into such possession. There is no evidence 
that any explanation given was unsatisfactory 
or inconsistent with the facts. As noted 
above, since the only evidence of taking in 
this case is the defendant's recent possession 
of allegedly stolen property, the State must 
not only show such possession, but it must 
show that the defendant failed to explain 
such possession. The record is totally devoid 
of any such proof, and therefore, defendant's 
motion to dismiss at the end of the State's 
case should have been granted by the court. 
It may be contended, however, that 
since the defendant went on to voluntarily 
relate to the court and jury an explanation 
for his possession of the automobile as part 
of the presentation of his case, the error 
~s corrected when the jury obviously rejected 
his explanation. It is of little help to the 
State to say that the jury did not believe 
the defendant's explanation and therefore it 
Was in any event unsatisfactory and the State's 
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foilure to show that in the first instance was 
oot prejudicial error. It must be emphasized 
that the State has the burden of proving the 
defendant gui 1 ty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
rt was the State, not the defendant, who had 
~e burden of showing that such explanation 
~s unsatisfactory. To permit a correction 
of the State's error by saying that the defen-
dant failed to prove that his explanation 
was satisfactory leads directly into the trap 
~ich the Potello case warned against. In 
effect, it shifts the burden of proving the 
lack of an essential element of a crime onto 
the defendant and puts off the determination 
of whether the State has met its burden of 
proof in making out a prima facie case until 
after the defense has presented its evidence. 
Such action would be entirely out of harmony 
with the system of American jurisprudence. 
It is not the statutory scheme and is expressly 
condemned by the Potello case. 
Even if the above condemned procedure 
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~s for some reason permissable, the case law 
is clear that once the defendant has presented 
his explanation, the State has the further 
~rden of proving that explanation false or 
i~lausable beyond a reasonable doubt. Here 
again, the State failed to meet its burden. 
In addition to testifying in his own behalf, 
the defendant presented the evidence of two 
~ditional witnesses --- Valorie Peterson 
Anderson and Larry Merrill. The testimony 
of the defendant and these two witnesses pre-
sented direct eye witness testimony explaining 
defendant's possession of the 1965 Comet auto-
oobile. All three consistently testified 
to the following. The three of them had 
gone to the Spanish Fork Municipal Park 
sometime after 12:30 a.m. on the morning of 
April 12, 1971, following a party at Larry 
Merrill's home. (Tr. 56, 57, 60, 62, 76). 
They had been there some time (Tr. 57) when 
i iliey saw a man lying on the lawn who appeared 
to be very sick. (Tr. 57, 63, 67-68) · The 
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~fendant returned from talking with the man 
and told the other two that he was going to 
take him home. (Tr. 63 and 68). The defendant 
t~n proceeded to help this individual toward 
s~e parked cars on the outskirts of the park. 
(Tr. 5 8 and 6 3) • Both Mrs. Ander son and 
fu, Merrill testified that they could not 
~ecif ically identify any of the parked cars 
as the 1965 Comet, but both testified that 
one of the parked cars fit the general descrip-
tion of the automobile in question. (Tr. 58 
and 63). Mrs. Anderson also testified that 
after she and Mr. Merrill left the park and 
were walking back to his home, a small white 
car matching the basic description of the 
~hicle in question drove past them from 
ilie direction of the park. The defendant 
~stified that he helped the individual to 
~e of the parked cars and took him to a 
~tel located between Provo and Springville. 
(Tr. 68 and 69). This individual gave the 
~fendant permission to use the automobile in 
22 
~der for the defendant to get home again 
with the understanding that the defendant 
was to return the automobile back to the motel 
ilie next morning. (Tr. 69). This was the 
automobile in which the defendant was sub-
sequently picked up. (Tr. 69). 
The law is clear that when the defendant 
~kes an explanation of his recent possession 
of stolen property and then supports that 
explanation with direct evidence, the State 
~s the burden of rebutting that evidence and 
of proving the explanation false. If it fails 
~do so, the State has not met its burden of 
proof and the inference raised by Section 
76-38-1 fails. The Utah Supreme Court made 
~is very clear in State v. Converse, 40 Utah 
72, 119 P.1030 (1911). The court pointed out 
that once such evidence has been presented, 
the failure of the State to rebutt that evi-
~nce takes the case from the jury. At 119 
P.1033, the court declared that in the absence 
of contrary evidence introduced by the State, 
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the jury "could not be permitted to disregard 
such direct evidence [of the defendant] or, 
as against it, ba.se a finding of the facts 
~on the mere presumption." As a result, even 
if for some reason the defendant was placed in 
a position so that the burden was upon him 
W satisfactorily explain away his possession 
of the stolen property, his pres en ta tion of 
direct evidence showing an explanation as to 
why he was in possession of that property re-
shifted the burden back to the State to dis-
~ove beyond a reasonable doubt the validity 
of such explanation. The State could not 
simply rely on the hope that the jury would 
disbelieve the defendant's evidence and therefor 
ilsregard it. The Converse decision clearly 
~ints out that such is not the province of 
~e jury. The State had the burden of present-
ing at least some rebuttal evidence. Its 
failure to do so constituted a failure to meet 
~ meet its burden of proof and as a result 
~ereof, the court erred in refusing to grant 
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defendant's motion to dismiss when it was 
again renewed at the close of the defendant's 
case. 
B. THE STATE FAILED, AS A MATTER OF 
LAW, TO PROVE THAT IF DEFENDANT 
TOOK THE 1965 COMET, HE TOOK IT 
WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE 
OWNERS. 
Assuming, for the sake of argument only, 
that the State did present sufficient evidence 
linking the defendant to the taking of the 
vehicle to get that question before the jury, 
defendant's motion to dismiss should neverthe-
less have been granted since the State totally 
failed in its proof of another essential 
element of the crime of larceny. It has long 
been held that in order to prove that the 
taking by the defendant constituted "felonious 
stealing" the State must show that the taking 
was without the consent of the owner. The 
general rule has been well stated in 50 Am. 
Jur. 2d, Larceny, §23 (1970) as follows: 
The felonious or fraudulent taking of 
personal property from the po~session.of 
another against his will or without his 
consent is essential to larceny, for a 
25 
trespass upon his right to possession 
is a characteristic of a larcenous 
taki~g, and the crime is not ordinarily 
committed where the property is taken with 
the full knowledge and consent of the 
owner or h~s authorized servant or agent, 
however guilty may be the taker's intent. 
The record clearly demonstrates that 
although Mrs. Lillian Hales was the registered 
~ner of the 1965 Mercury Comet automobile, 
~ich is the subject of this law suit, her 
son, Larry Hales, was the principal user of 
the vehicle and in fact had paid for the same 
and also received the proceeds from its sub-
sequent sale. Both the State and the lower 
court recognized this beneficial ownership in 
Larry Hales when the court permitted the State 
~ amend the information filed herein to show 
both Lillian Hales and Larry Hales as the dual 
~ners of the vehicle. (Tr. 46-48). As a 
result, either Lillian Hales or Larry Hales 
could have legally consented to the use of 
llie vehicle by the defendant and the State, 
in order to prove its case, had to show a 
lack of consent on the part of both. This 
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~e State failed to do. The State did illicit 
testimony from Lillian Hales to the effect 
~at she did not consent to the defendant's 
use of the automobile. (Tr. 14-15). On the 
oth~r hu.nd, the State made no effort whatso-
ever to show lack of consent on the part of 
~rry Hales. The subject was not brought up 
and the record is totally devoid of any 
evidence upon which the jury could have made 
any rational finding on that point. Based 
thereon, it is again submitted that defendant's 
motion to dismiss made at the conclusion of 
~e State's case was well taken and the court 
corrunitted prejudicial error in refusing to 
grant said motion. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT 
THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
FOR LACK OF EVIDENCE AT THE CONCLUSION 
OF THE TRIAL AND BEFORE THE CASE 
WAS SUBMITTED TO THE JURY. 
All of the issues raised under Point I 
above are equally applicable here since if 
they justified dismissal of the action at the 
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conclusion of the presentation of the State's 
case, they certainly would still justify 
dismissal when the motion was renewed prior 
to submitting the case to the jury. However, 
there is a separate and independent ground for 
dismissal of this action which arose after 
defendant presented its case, which is equally 
as persuasive for dismissal. 
Another of the elements essential to 
a conviction of the crime of grand larceny 
is that the property be taken with the intent 
to seal. In other words, the defendant must 
have taken the property with the intent to 
permanently deprive the owner of possession 
thereof. Failure to prove such intent must 
result in an aquittal of the defendant. The 
Utah Supreme Court has succinctly stated this 
proposition in State v. Dubois, 64 Utah 433, 
2 31 P • 6 2 5 I 6 2 6 ( 19 2 4 ) a S f 011 OW S : 
The mere taking of personal property 
belonging to another does not, of course, 
constitute larceny. The taking must be 
with a felonious intent to steal and this 
element must be established by the circum-
stances of the taking or other proper proof. 
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The State contended in the court below 
that this felonious intent could be inferred 
from the defendant's action in apparently 
attempting to avoid apprehension when he sped 
away from the officer reulting in a high speed 
chase through the City of Provo. (Tr. 52) . 
This evidence of intent is clearly circumstan-
tial, and is not sufficient to sustain a 
! finding that the defendant took the 1965 Comet 
with the intent to steal it. When circumstan-
tial evidence may be reasonably and rationally 
explained on more than one ground, and one of 
the grounds is consistent with the defendant's 
innocense and inconsistent with his guilt, 
then that circumstantial evidence is insuffi-
cient as a matter of law to constitute a basis 
for conviction of a crime. The general rule 
has been well stated in the decision of 
Cabianchi v. People, 111 Colo. 298, 141 P.2d 
688 (1943). In that case, the court reversed 
a murder conviction where proof of an essential 
element was based upon circumstantial evidence. 
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That circumstantial evidence consisted of a 
slatement claimed to have been made by the 
defendant which the state claimed was incrimin-
atory. In examining the effect of that state-
ment, the court said at 141 P.2d 692: 
The circumstance indicated by the 
statement attributed to the defen-
dant, while consistent with guilt, 
is equally consistent with innocense. 
There can be no question that when 
such is the fact and circumstantial 
evidence alone is relied upon, a 
circumstance or circumstances con-
sistent with guilt, but equally 
consistent with innocense does not 
constitute sufficient proof to sus-
tain the conviction. 
Furthermore, it is clear that this 
determination is one for the court and not 
for the jury. In State v. Alkhowarizmi, 101 
i 
1 
Ariz. 514, 421 P.2d 871 (1966), the Arizona 
Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new 
trial a conviction in a sodomy case based upon 
circumstantial evidence. The defendant in the 
lower court had moved for dismissal claiming 
that the circumstantial evidence was insuffi-
cient to convict the defendant. In speaking 
to that issue, the court said at 421 P.2d 872: 
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In view of the fact that inconsistent 
conclusions are reasonable from the 
circumstances, and the conclusions 
consistent with innocense are as 
equally reasonable as the inference 
consistent with guilt, the trial 
court erred when it denied defendant's 
motion to dismiss and submitted the 
case to the jury. 
There can be little question that these 
principles are applicable today in the Utah 
courts. Our own Supreme Court made this 
very clear in the decision of State v. Laub, 
131 P.2d 805 (1942) when it said at 131 P.2d 
807: 
While the state's evidence is 
circumstantial, such evidence may be 
just as conclusive or even more so 
than direct evidence, but the pro-
secution still has the burden of 
proving beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant is guilty. Or 
stated another way, the prosecution 
must "not only show by a preponderance 
of evidence that an offense was 
committed, and that the alleged facts 
and circumstances are true, but they 
must also be such facts and circum-
stances as are incompatible upon any 
reasonable hypothesis, with the 
innocense of the accused, and 
incapable of explanation upon any 
reasonable hypothesis other than the 
defendant's guilt". [Ci ting cases] . 
As pointed out in Underhill's 
Criminal Evidence, 4th Edition, Page 
21, "all the circumstances as proved 
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must be consistent with each other, 
and they are to be taken together as 
proved. Being consistent with each 
other and taken together, they must 
point surely and unharringly in the 
direction of guilt . " Hence if 
two reasonable hypothesis are pointed 
out by the evidence and one of them 
points to the defendants' innocense, 
it would then be difficult to see 
how any jury can be convinced beyond 
a reasonable doubt of the defendants' 
guilt. 
Is the defendant's apparent attempt 
to flee apprehension by a police officer 
consistent only with a finding that the 
defendant had taken the automobile in question 
with an intent to steal it and permanently 
deprive the owner of possession thereof, or 
are such circumstances equally consistent 
with other reasonable hypothesis? When the 
defendant was questioned concerning his 
apparent attempt to flee the police officer, 
he presented a perfectly reasonable and 
rational explanation of his actions on a basis 
other than an intent to steal the automobile. 
For some period prior to the trial, 
the defendant had been suffering from the 
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"excessive" use of drugs. His problem had 
been characterized as a "significant one". 
(R. 8). One of the inherent problems arising 
from the excessive use of drugs, especially 
LSD, is what has been com_rnonly called a 
"flashback" during which a person may react 
in all respects as though he were under the 
influence of drugs when in fact at that 
moment he is not. The defendant testified 
that the reason why he failed to stop as the 
officer began pulling him over with the flash-
ing lights was because of a drug flashback in 
which he in effect blacked out and could not 
remember anything that occurred during the 
insuing high speed chase. (Tr. 70). 
Under the circumstances of the defendant's 
serious drug problem as evidenced by Dr. 
Washburn's letter to Judge Sorenson of April 
14, 1971 (R. 8), defendant's explanation of 
his actions is perfectly plausible. It pre-
sents a reasonable alternative hypothesis to 
I 
I 
the inference that defendant tried to avoid 
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arrest because he had in fact taken the auto-
oobile with the intent to steal it. As a 
result, this single piece of circumstantial 
~idence pointing to defendant's intent to 
steal the vehicle as a matter of law, could 
not form the basis of a conviction for larceny. 
The State was under the burden to present 
additional evidence demonstrating either 
that defendant's explanation was unreasonable 
or irrational, or that it tended to indepen-
dently establish this element of the crime. 
The State's failure to do so constituted a 
failure to carry its burden of proof and the 
court should properly have granted defendant's 
motion to dismiss at the conclusion of the 
trial. 
POINT III 
THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF THE 
REASONABLE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL 
A. The constitutional right to the 
assistance of counsel in a criminal case (U.S. 
Const. 6th Amend, 14th Amend.; see Gideon v. 
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~nwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 
L.Ed 2d 799 (1963)) includes the guarantee 
that such assistance be "effective". See 
Powell v. State of Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 
S. Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932); People v. 
Ibarra, 60 Cal. 2d 460, 34 Cal. Reptr. 863 
386 P.2d 487 (1963) that "effective" counsel 
required by due process, however, is not 
erro~less counsel; rather it is counsel 
"reasonably likely to render and rendering 
reasonably effective assistance". Mac Kenna 
v • E 11 is , 2 8 0 F . 2 d 5 9 2 , 5 9 9 ( 5th Cir . 19 6 0) , 
modified, 289 F.2d 928; Brubaker v. Dickson, 
310 F.2d 30, 37 (9th Cir. 1962); People v. 
McDoNell, 69 Cal. 2d 737, 748, 447 P.2d 97 
(1968); In Re Williams, 1 Cal. 3d 168, 460 
P.2d 984 (1969). 
Although the determination of whether 
the demands of due process have been met in 
1 a particular case is always "a question of 
judgment and degree" to be answered in light 
of all the circumstances and with the view to 
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fundamental fairness". Brubaker v. Dickson, 
supra; People v. Ibarra, supra; People v. 
~~~ell, supra. Certain general standards 
have evolved for the aid of the court making 
this determination. Fundamental among these 
is that which places upon counsel the duty 
to conduct careful factual and legal investi-
gation and inquiries with a view to develop-
ing matters of defense in order that he may 
make informed decisions on his client's behalf, 
both at the pleading stage (see Von Motke v. 
Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 68 S. Ct. 116, 92 L.Ed. 
309 (1948); In Re Williams, supra; Wilson v. 
Rose, 366 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1966), and at the 
trial Brubaker v. Dickson, supra; People v. 
McDowell, supra; People v. Ibarra, supra. 
If counsel's failure to undertake such 
careful inquiries and investigations results 
in withdrawing a crucial defense from the 
caBe, the defendant has not had the assistance 
to which he is entitled." People v. Ibarra, 
~upra; In Re Williams, supra; Brubaker v. 
Dickson, supra. The above-cited language 
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in appellant's argument Point III is practi-
cally a verbatim account of the Supreme 
court of California's opinion in the In Re 
Saunders decision, 88 Cal. Rptr. 633, 472 P.2d 
921, 926 (1970), a case involving practically 
the same issue as presented by this appeal. 
In the case of Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 
30, 38-39 (9th Cir. 1962) the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held 
that a violation of the defendant's right 
to the effective representation of counsel 
had been sufficiently alleged and stated: 
Upon examination of the whole record, 
we conclude that appellant alleged 
a combination of circumstances not 
refuted by the record which, if true, 
precluded the presentation of his 
available defenses to the court and 
the jury through no fault of his own, 
and thus rendered his trial funda-
mentally unfair. Appellant does not 
complain that after investigation 
and research trial counsel made 
decisions of tactics and strategy 
injurious to appellant's cause; the 
allegation is rather that trial counsel 
failed to prepare, and that appellant's 
defense was withheld not through de-
llberate through faulty judgment, but 
in default of knowledge that reasonable 
inquiry would have produced, and hence 
in default of any judgment at all. 
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The ommissions alleged by appellant 
were not mistakes of counsel or error 
in the course of the trial. If true, 
they constituted a total failure to 
present the cause of the accused in any 
fundamental respect. Such a proceed-
ing would not constitute for the 
accused the fair trial contemplated 
by the due process clause. Id. 310 
F.2d 30, 38-39. 
The case presently on appeal is not 
unlike the Saunders or Brubaker cases (cited 
supra) with respect to the pretrial prepara-
tion of the defense attorney. When the 
demands upon an attorney's time become so all-
enveloping so as to preclude him from conduct-
ing an adequate pretrial investigation, inter-
viewing of defendant's witnesses and an app-
ropriate medical history inquiry in order 
to adequately prepare his defense, he may not 
be said to have rendered the defendant the 
adequate and effective assistance of counsel 
guaranteed by the 6th amendment. (See Powell 
v. Alabama, supra; People v. Ibarra, supra; 
In Re Saunders, supra. Although the in-
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efficiency of counsel may not be raised when 
the defendant has retained his own private 
attorney, he should not be held responsible 
for inefficiency of court-appointed counsel 
(See Darcey v. Handy, 203 F.2d 407 (3 Cir. 
1953) cert. denied, 346 U.S. 865 (1954); 
Lotz v. Saers, 292 F.2d 657 (6th Cir.); 
Popeko v. U.S., 294 F.2d 168 (5th Cir.); 
Root v. Cunningham, 344 F.2d 1 (4th Cir.). 
Perhaps no single incident in this case would 
justify a finding of "inadequate or ineffective" 
assistance of counsel but the totality of 
events and the representation as a whole, as 
can be determined by a reading of both the 
defendant's affidavit (on file in the record 
herein) and the record of the trial, do clearly 
indicate the defendant was inadequately and 
ineffectively represented. The importance of 
the record is not so much what the record 
contains, but what is conspicuously absent by 
way of defense in the record of the trial. 
To permit the defendant's conviction 
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for a felony with representation so lacking 
in investigation and preparation as to render 
the defendant's counsel's performance a 
perfunctory formality, of all form and no 
substance, so as to render the trial itself a 
farse and a sham, is not only in violation 
of the 6th amendment and the mandate of 
Gideon v. Wainwright, but is totally anti-
thetical to traditional notions of Anglo 
American jurisprudence. 
B. The defendant court-appointed 
counsel's failure to aduce medical evidence 
was sufficient by itself to render his defense 
unconstitutionally inadequate. 
One of the crucial elements of the 
crime of grand larceny is the "intent to 
permanently deprive the owner of his property". 
The only evidence the State introduced to 
support this essential element was the fact 
that when the state highway patrolman turned 
on his flashing red lights and attempted to 
pull the defendant over to the curb, the 
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defendant at first slowed down then took off 
and a high speed chase insued. The defendant 
repeatedly informed his counsel of his former 
~ug problem and suseptibility to the drug 
"flashback" phenomenon. Al though he informed 
his counsel of medical personnel at the State 
Hospital where he had been a patient who could 
verify and coroberate his testimony, the 
attorney not only failed to investigate this 
defense, but he made no attempt to assert it 
at trial. As to the substantiality and medical 
validity of the policeman's flashing red lights 
as inducing petit mal epileptic seizure, see 
, Photic Driving; Clinical Neurology P.146 (1964); 
for the effect of flashing lights on long term 
LSD users, see Van Deusen & Metzer, The Long 
Term Effect of Psychodilics, I Clinical 
Toxicology P.227-234 (1968) 
It is practically common knowledge to 
medical personnel experienced in the study of 
psycholedic users that flashing red lights 
often cause gross confusion to the former 
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LSD user, and has even been known to induce 
the flashback phenomenon, yet such medical 
evidence was not even offered at trial. 
The Supreme Court of California, in 
In Re Saunders, 88 Cal. Rptr. 633, 472 P.2d 
921 (1970) was presented with the question 
of failure to introduce evidence of the 
defendant's prior medical history of brain 
dysfunction. In that case the court stated: 
In view of the matter established 
by record in habeas corpus proceeding 
showing that counsel at some time 
prior to defendant's murder trial 
decided to withhold the issue of defen-
dant's diminished capacity from the 
trial without the benefit of substantial 
factual inquiry into specifics of 
defendant's medical condition, notwith-
standing that counsel knew defendant 
has sustained head injuries which 
resulted in organic brain damage. 
Defendant was deprived of his right to 
effective assistance of counsel [Con-
viction reversed] [Emphasis added] . 
Id. at P. 922. 
It is the contention of the appellant 
i that in this case as in the Saunders case 
counsel's failure to adduce at trial medical 
evidence of organic brain dysfunction which 
Was repeatedly brought to the attention of 
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counsel (such evidence going to the essential 
issue of intent and which in itself constitutes 
a substantial defense) then such failure by 
itself constitutes inadequate and ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, since the State failed in its 
~rden of putting on a prima facie case against 
the defendant proving grand larceny in that 
they produced no evidence to refute or rebut 
defendant's explanation of the recent poss-
ession, the case should not have been sub-
mitted to the jury, but rather the court 
, should have granted defendant's motion to 
dismiss at the conclusion of State's case. 
To hold otherwise would shift the burden of 
·proof to the defendant. 
Secondly, the State failed, as a matter 
of law, to prove the corpus delicti in that 
no evidence was introduced whatever that the 
true owner of the vehicle, Larry Hales, did 
not give permission to use the vehicle. 
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Therefore, as a matter of law, the State did 
not prove a crime had been committed. 
Third, the defendant's court-appointed 
counsel's failure in making any investigation 
or inquiring into the facts of the case, his 
failure to interview defense witnesses until 
20 minutes prior to trial, and his failure to 
introduce extremely significant medical history, 
evidence which in itself constitutes a major 
defense, evidences a total lack of preparation 
on the part of defendant's counsel sufficient 
to warrant a finding of inadequate and in-
effective representation of the defendant's 
case. 
For the above-stated reasons, the 
defendant respectfully requests that the 
conviction be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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